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Ever since Adam and Eve brought forth the first children,
human beings have tried to capture the processes of procreation
and bring them under control. We find midwives assisting with
childbirth as early as Exodus in scripture, and Caesarian section
birth is seen in use in ancient Rome.1 The pace of human interven-
tions into procreation has increased rapidly over the generations to
the point where today we are faced with an explosion of radically
new methods that can be used to revise and repair reproductive
processes. Technologies such as in vitro fertilization and egg dona-
tion are increasingly being employed for those who are infertile.2
Reproductive cloning and the use of artificial wombs to bring chil-
dren into the world are on the horizon.
3
Protestant denominations span a broad range of views about the
morality of employing such new reproductive technologies.' Al-
though they embrace normative standards of conduct, many de-
nominations do not have a central teaching authority to guide
members who are concerned about whether to use these new ways
of conceiving and bearing children.' Such questions are among
* Faculty Affiliate, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University; B.A.,
Barnard College, 1956; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1970; J.D., University of Michi-
gan Law School, 1985.
1. Exodus 1:15-21; see also JEAN DONNISON, MIDWIVES AND MEDICAL MEN: A
HISTORY OF STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL OF CHILDBIRTH 1 (1998).
2. See Cynthia B. Cohen, Introduction, in NEW WAYS OF MAKING BABIES: THE
CASE OF EGG DONATION Xi (Cynthia B. Cohen ed., 1996) [hereinafter NEW WAYS OF
MAKING BABIES]; see also Cynthia B. Cohen, Parents Anonymous, in NEW WAYS OF
MAKING BABIES, supra note 2, at 88-89 [hereinafter Cohen, Parents Anonymous].
3. See Mark W.J. Ferguson, Contemporary and future possibilities for human em-
bryonic manipulation, in EXPERIMENTS ON EMBRYOS 22 (Anthony Dyson & John
Harris eds., 1990); see also Ronald Cole-Turner, The Era of Biological Control, in
BEYOND CLONING: RELIGION AND THE REMAKING OF HUMANITY 2-6 (Ronald Cole-
Turner ed., 2001) [hereinafter BEYOND CLONING].
4. The Ethics of Human Cloning and Stem Cell Research, A Report from Califor-
nia Cloning. A Dialogue on State Regulation (Oct. 12, 2001), at http://www.scu.edu/
ethics/publications/cloning.html.
5. Ronald Cole-Turner, At the Beginning, in HUMAN CLONING: RELIGIOUS RE-
SPONSES 126-27 (Ronald Cole-Turner ed., 1997).
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matters of substantial morality left to individual conscience, guided
by scripture, tradition, reason, and experience. Since these various
resources are each interpreted in somewhat different ways within
Protestant thought, it is not possible to state the Protestant moral
position about the use of the new reproductive technologies. Even
so, certain relevant values and beliefs at the core of Protestant
thought can be canvassed to gain a sense of how those adhering to
this form of the Christian tradition tend to view the morality of
employing these new technologies.
The Protestant tradition places high value on individual human
dignity and choice.6 It maintains that human capacities for under-
standing and willing, even though flawed, still reflect the image of
God.7 Consequently, individual decisions about the use of novel
reproductive technologies are owed great respect. Couples should
be allowed to weigh the ends and goods toward which these tech-
nologies can be put, and to choose among them based on their un-
derstanding of what Christian ethics requires.
Yet, individual human beings are not isolated atoms, 8 and pro-
creation is not exclusively a private matter.9 Bringing children into
the world is a shared activity involving a relationship between pro-
spective parents, and should children result from their relationship,
another between parents and children. Moreover, procreation is
inseparable from broader social relations and goods, in that it
brings new members into the community who are owed care and
protection. Consequently, the way in which children are conceived
and born, for the Protestant tradition, is not only a matter of indi-
vidual concern, but also of familial, social, and Christian concern.
Evaluating which, if any, are appropriate uses of the new repro-
ductive technologies within the Protestant tradition requires con-
sideration of Christian teachings about the meaning of procreation,
the good of the resulting children, and the integrity of family
bonds. Such considerations have led many Protestant thinkers to
contend that it is morally acceptable for individuals to employ
6. See Abigail Rian Evans, Saying No to Human Cloning, in HUMAN CLONING:
RELIGIOUS RESPONSES, supra note 5, at 27-29.
7. HESSEL BOUMA III ET AL., HEALTH, & MEDICAL PRACTICE 57-66 (1989);
CYNTHIA B. COHEN ET AL., FAITHFUL LIVING, FAITHFUL DYING: ANGLICAN REFLEC-
TIONS ON END OF LIFE CARE 61-62 (2000); DAVID H. SMITH, HEALTH AND MEDICINE
IN THE ANGLICAN TRADITION: CONSCIENCE, COMMUNITY, AND COMPROMISE 9-11
(1986).
8. Duane H. Larson, Lutheran Theological Foundations for an Ethics of Cloning,
in HUMAN CLONING: PAPERS FROM A CHURCH CONSULTATION 35, 38 (2000); SMITH,
supra note 7, at 11-12.
9. BOUMA ET AL., supra note 7, at 182-86;.SMITH, supra note 7, at 82-83.
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these novel methods of creating children, but within certain lim-
its."0 Protestant thinkers differ, however, about exactly where
these limits should be drawn. Even so, a certain degree of agree-
ment can be found among them.
I. REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE PURPOSES OF SEX
To understand the predominant Protestant approach to the use
of reproductive technologies, it is necessary first to grasp the signif-
icance of procreation within Protestant thought. This can be better
understood and explicated by contrasting it with Jewish thought.
Within Judaism, procreation is heavily emphasized as the major
end of sexuality within marriage.11 This procreative thrust is sup-
ported by the Priestly account of creation in Genesis,12 in which
God commands humankind to be fruitful and multiply. 13 Having
children and raising them to become integral members of the com-
munity and carry on its traditions promotes social identity and en-
sures the survival of Israel as a people.1 4 Although companionship
is also an end of sexuality within marriage for Judaism, its primary
focus is on bringing forth progeny. That is why, when a man and a
woman are married in a Jewish ceremony, they sign a contract in
which they agree to perform their respective parts, so that children
will be born to bear the identity of their parents and their people
into the future.15
In Protestant thought, in contrast, sexual relations within mar-
riage are often more closely tied to companionship than to having
children or forming a people.1 6 Protestants tend to rely on the
Jahwist account of creation in Genesis, 7 which although later in
sequence, was given its edited form some three hundred years
10. BOUMA ET AL., supra note 7, at 195.
11. PETER BROWN, THE BODY AND SOCIETY: MEN, WOMEN AND SEXUAL RE-
NUNCIATION IN EARLY CHRISTIANITY 61-65 (1988); ROLAND DE VAUX, ANCIENT
ISRAEL: ITS LIFE AND INSTITUTIONS 34-37 (John McHughes trans., McGraw-Hill
1961); ELLIOT N. DORFF & ARTHUR ROSETT, A LIVING TREE: THE ROOTS AND
GROWTH OF JEWISH LAW 485-86 (1988).
12. Genesis 1:1-2:4a.
13. Id. at 1:28.
14. ELAINE PAGELS, ADAM, EVE, AND THE SERPENT 13 (1988); Timothy F.
Sedgwick, The Transformation of Sexuality and the Challenge of Conscience, in OUR
SELVES, OUR SOULS & BODIES: SEXUALITY AND THE HOUSEHOLD OF GOD 30-32
(Charles Hefling ed., 1996).
15. DORFF & ROSETT, supra note 11, at 451-54.
16. Sedgwick, supra note 14, at 33-35.
17. Genesis 2:4b-3:24.
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before the Priestly account. 18 In it, companionship is emphasized
as a significant end of human sexuality. Adam is formed from the
dust of the ground, whereupon God declares, "It is not good that
the man should be alone." 9 Woman is, therefore, taken from
Adam's rib as he sleeps. 20 Man and woman are made for one an-
other; emerging from one flesh, they are called once again to unity.
That sexual relations within marriage are closely tied to compan-
ionship is borne out at several points in the Gospels where Jesus
challenges the Jewish understanding of human sexuality.2' For ex-
ample, in the gospel of Mark, Jesus responds to a question about
whether it is lawful for a man to divorce his wife (which was al-
lowed within Judaism if she were barren, among other reasons) as
follows:
From the beginning of creation, "God made them male and fe-
male." "For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother
and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh."
So they are not longer two, but one flesh. Therefore what God
has joined together, let no one separate.22
In this and other passages,23 Jesus asserts that companionship is
the primary end of sexual union within marriage. Elaine Pagels
observes that, "By subordinating the obligation to procreate, re-
jecting divorce, and implicitly sanctioning monogamous relation-
ships, Jesus reverses traditional priorities declaring, in effect, that
other obligations, including marital ones, are now more important
than procreation. ' 24 Marriage is no longer grounded in a contrac-
tual agreement in which something is done in order to realize
something else, but is a matter of mutual commitment between two
persons, regardless of the consequences. This is reflected in the
marriage vows of the Episcopal tradition, for instance, in which
man and woman take each other "for better for worse, for richer
for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to cherish, until
we are parted by death. '25 Those being married are told:
18. LISA SOWLE CAHILL, BETWEEN THE SEXES: FOUNDATIONS FOR A CHRISTIAN
ETHICS OF SEXUALITY 53-56 (1985); Phyllis A. Bird, Genesis I-III as a Source for a
Contemporary Theology of Sexuality, 3 Ex AUDITU 31, 36-39 (1987).
19. Genesis 2:18.
20. Id. at 2:22.
21. Sedgwick, supra note 14, at 33.
22. Mark 10:6-8.
23. See Matthew 19:3-6; Luke 16:18; 1 Corinthians 7:10-11.
24. PAGELS, supra note 14, at 16.
25. The Celebration and Blessing of a Marriage, in THE BOOK OF COMMON
PRAYER ACCORDING TO THE USE OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH 427 (1979).
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The union of husband and wife in heart, body, and mind is in-
tended by God for their mutual joy; for the help and comfort
given one another in prosperity and adversity; and, when it is
God's will, for the procreation of children and their nurture in
the knowledge and love of the Lord.26
Thus, sexuality within marriage in Protestant thought is tied to
agape, love that leads man and woman to embrace and care for one
another. Instead of gaining identity and fulfillment in the future
through their children, they do so now in their love for one an-
other.27 In accord with this approach, the Lutheran Church in
America, a precursor of the contemporary Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America, maintained that, "God has established the sex-
ual relation for the purpose of bringing husband and wife into full
unity so that they may enrich and be a blessing to each other. '28
Their relationship is grounded in an unconditional steadfast love
and trust that turns outward to embrace and care for children who
may be its fruit. Should man and woman be blessed with children
consequent on their mutual commitment, they are to acknowledge
and care for them on behalf of God. Having and rearing children
has always been valued within Protestantism. 29 An openness to
procreation, however, is not essential to the sanctification of sexu-
ality within marriage in the Protestant tradition. The use of contra-
ception, for instance, is readily accepted, as is sexual expression
within marriage after menopause.30
Some within Protestantism would disagree with this interpreta-
tion of the Protestant view of the weight of procreation, arguing
either that procreation is the central Christian rationale for sexual
union or that it is co-equal in importance with the unitive end.31
Consequently, they consider it illicit to use the new reproductive
technologies to generate children, since this necessarily involves
the separation of these two ends. This is a vexed question. Certain
early Church Fathers took procreation as the sole acceptable end
26. Id. at 424.
27. Sedgwick, supra note 14, at 32.
28. Sex, Marriage, and Family: A Clarifying Convention Minute of the Lutheran
Church in America, J. LUTHERAN ETHICS (1964), at http://www.elca.org/jle/Ica/
Ica.sexmarriage-family.html (last visitied Oct. 20, 2002).
29. TED PETERS, FOR THE LOVE OF CHILDREN: GENETIC TECHNOLOGY AND THE
FUTURE OF THE FAMILY 128 (1996).
30. Margaret A. Farley, Sexual Ethics, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 2363,
2368 (2d ed. 1995).
31. OLIVER O'DONOVAN, BEGOTrEN OR MADE? 14-30 (1984); PAUL RAMSEY,
FABRICATED MAN: THE ETHICS OF GENETIC CONTROL 38-39 (1970); Gilbert Mei-
laender, Begetting and Cloning, FIRST THINGS, June/July 1997, at 41-43.
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of human sexuality within marriage. Augustine, a significant figure
within the early Christian tradition, turned the various strands of
asceticism about sex of his own day into a firm and explicit procre-
ative ethic. He maintained that sexual desire is God's crowning
punishment for Adam and Eve's disobedience and that sexual
union in fulfillment of desire is therefore morally unacceptable.32
According to Augustine, only the intention of bringing children
into the world can excuse acting upon sexual desire.33 Critics
charge that his analysis of sexuality is not consistent with scripture
or with other strands of the Christian tradition that frame sex
within a generous love.34 Even so, his view had enormous influ-
ence over the Christian tradition in the first half of its history.35
This gradually changed among some, but not all, major Protestant
thinkers in the later centuries of Christianity. Calvin, for instance,
maintained that the greatest good of marriage and sex was the soci-
ety that is formed between husband and wife. 36 As the Reforma-
tion progressed, Luther wrote along similar lines: "[B]y the grace
of God now everyone declares that it is something good and holy
to live with one's wife in harmony and peace even if one should
have a wife who is barren or is troubled by other ills." 37
Protestants are generally concerned about moving procreation
out of the loving embrace of couples and into the medical labora-
tory because this seems to mechanize and objectify procreation.38
However, when couples elect to use new reproductive technologies
because these provide the only way in which they can circumvent
natural processes that have gone awry, their choice is not in itself
wrong.39 Children who are born with the aid of reproductive tech-
nologies can spring from a love between man and woman that is as
deep and intimate as that between couples whose reproductive
channels bear fruit without medical assistance.
32. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 14-16 (Marcus Dods trans., 1950).
33. Id.
34. THOMAS E. BREIDENTHAL, CHRISTIAN HOUSEHOLDS: THE SANCTIFICATION
OF NEARNESS 124-228 (1997); PETERS, supra note 29, at 121-26.
35. Farley, supra note 30, at 2367.
36. See generally JOHN CALVIN, COMMENTARY ON GENESIS (John King trans. &
ed., 2001) (1975).
37. MARTIN LUTHER, Genesis Chapters 1-5, in 1 LUTHER'S WORKS 135 (Jaraslov
Pelikan ed., 1958).
38. BOUMA ET AL., supra note 7, at 193.
39. Id. at 193-94; PETERS, supra note 29, at 140-53.
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II. DESIGNER BABIES, THIRD PARTIES, AND ORPHAN EMBRYOS
Not every possible use of the new reproductive technologies is
justifiable in Protestant thought, however. Parents are the
procreators, rather than the creators of their children, meaning that
children are their trusts, rather than their possessions, products, or
projects. Children are to be cherished not only as expressions of
the mutual love between man and woman, but also as persons with
their own integrity and uniqueness. 40 They are not valued because
they can secure the identity of their parents or their community in
the future. Hence, Protestant thought maintains that it is wrong to
use the new reproductive technologies to produce made-to-order
children who have been shaped to meet arbitrary parental or social
standards of beauty or perfection.41 Such an instrumental view of
the value of children runs the risk, not only of denying the integrity
and value of each child, but also of reinforcing discriminatory and
harmful stereotypes that surface all too frequently in our society.
The shadow of the eugenics movement hovers over such perfec-
tionist reproductive choices and raises the question of what sort of
society we want to become.42
Given this view of the meaning of procreation and parenting, the
enunciation of a right to reproduce sounds odd to Protestant ears.
Protestants see themselves as gifted with children, rather than enti-
tled to them by right. Moreover, a right to exercise "quality con-
trol of offspring" sounds even more odd.43 Children are not to be
"acquired" on grounds that they meet certain parental pre-concep-
tion specifications and desires, but are to be welcomed as persons
in their own right, regardless of their traits. Methodist theologian
Sondra Ely Wheeler observes:
In our urgency to provide would-be parents with whatever they
want, and can pay for, we have allowed ourselves to forget a
lesson that should have been burned into our brains with the
abolition of slavery and the repeal of laws that made women and
40. Brent Waters, One Flesh? Cloning, Procreation, and the Family, in HUMAN
CLONING: RELIGIOUS RESPONSES, supra note 5, at 78, 82-85.
41. Sondra E. Wheeler, Contingency, Tragedy, and the Virtues of Parenting, in BE-
YOND CLONING, supra note 3, at 111, 117-19.
42. Cynthia B. Cohen, Creating Tomorrow's Children: The Right to Reproduce,
Public Policy, and Germ Line Interventions [hereinafter Cohen, Creating Tomorrow's
Children], in HUMAN GENETIC MODIFICATIONS ACROSS GENERATIONS: ASSESSING
THE SCIENTIFIC, ETHICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND POLICY ISSUES 132-52 (Audrey R. Chap-
man & Mark Frankel eds., 2002).
43. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW RE-
PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 150-51 (1994).
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children property: no one can have a right to another human
being."
We will reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of what procrea-
tion and parenthood mean if we come to view children as ours by
right, as products we create or acquire to serve our own interests
and desires. 45
Serious reservations have also been raised by some Protestant
thinkers about the use of third party "donors" to assist couples to
have children, as occurs in oocyte donation and artificial insemina-
tion by a donor.46 These reservations are grounded in three major
concerns-that third party donation may: 1) diminish the impor-
tance of the biological relationship between parents and children
and within the family; 2) have a serious negative psychological im-
pact on children; and 3) lead to the commodification and commer-
cialization of procreation.
Whether the biological relation between parent and child may be
severed from their-social relation without moral onus is a troubling
question for Protestants. They have been reluctant to accept such
severance, maintaining that those who engender a biological rela-
tionship to a child create certain moral obligations to that child that
cannot be dismissed out of hand.47 It is true that in adoption the
biological and social relation between parent and child is sundered
without moral censure. Yet this does not mean that it is also mor-
ally licit to allow such separation in other contexts, including gam-
ete donation. What we celebrate about adoption is not the
separation of the biological from the social, but that adoptive par-
ents treat already existing children, whose biological parents can-
not rear them, with the kind of love and care they are obligated to
give to children born to them. Gamete donation, in contrast, in-
volves a pre-conception decision to give away biological children
whom their procreators are under obligation to care for and nur-
ture. "Begetting is not merely biological and physical; it is essen-
tially parental, entailing obligations for nurturing the child,"
Bouma and colleagues, of the Reformed tradition, maintain.48
Some, therefore, conclude that to accept adoption as moral does
not provide good reason to do the same for third party gamete
44. Wheeler, supra note 41, at 123.
45. Karen Lebaqz, Genes, Justice, and Clones, in HUMAN CLONING: RELIGIOUS
RESPONSES, supra note 5, at 49, 55-56.
46. SMITH, supra note 7, at 82-84.
47. See O'DONOVAN, supra note 31, at 35-38.
48. BOUMA ET AL., supra note 7, at 196.
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donation.49 Others, however, focus on what happens to the child
once born, maintaining that the loving nurture of a child within a
stable family is more important than whether that child is biologi-
cally related to its rearing parents."0 They believe that those who
seek to have children with the assistance of third parties can pro-
vide these children with the same love and care required of biologi-
cal parents. Protestants, therefore, remain divided about the moral
weight to be given to the biological and social connections of par-
ent to child in considering the moral licitness of using third party
donors.
Protestants have also been concerned about the potential of
third party donation to reconceive the family.51 The use of gametes
from donors enlarges the class of those who can become parents
beyond traditional biological bounds, opening the door to
parenthood to single persons, those beyond normal reproductive
age, and gay and lesbian couples. If we are to develop fundamen-
tally new understandings of the family, they maintain-and this is a
large "if" for many Protestants-we should do so reflectively as a
community, rather than by chance as isolated individuals following
our own desires.
An additional consideration raised by Protestants is that the use
of donors might have a detrimental psychological and social impact
on the children born of their gametes. Some argue that it is impor-
tant to the healthy development of children that they know of their
biological origins and wrong to deny them this information. 2
When their origins are hidden from children, there is always the
risk of inadvertent disclosure of the circumstances of their concep-
tion. And yet, when children are told outright of their atypical ori-
gins, they may feel and be treated as radically different from other
children. 3 Thus, gamete donation would seem to run the risk of
negatively affecting children psychologically and socially no matter
how much or little they know of their origins. Protestant thinkers,
while sensitive to this issue, generally do not believe they have suf-
ficient information about this to determine whether the use of
sperm and eggs donors is seriously detrimental to the resulting
children.
49. O'DONOVAN, supra note 31, at 36-37.
50. BD. OF Soc. RESPONSIBILITY, CHURCH OF ENG., PERSONAL ORIGINS 50-51 (2d
rev. ed. 1996) [hereinafter PERSONAL ORIGINS].
51. GILBERT C. MEILAENDER, BODY, SOUL, AND BIOETHICS 65-66 (1995).
52. PERSONAL ORIGINS, supra note 50, at 69.
53. Cohen, Parents Anonymous, supra note 2, at 97-98.
2002]
144 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
In Protestant thought, gametes, as the means of making possible
new life, are not negligible body products to be bought and sold in
the open market.54 If they are to be given to infertile couple , this
should be done as a free and voluntary gift. Our current practice
of paying gamete donors runs the danger that we will place price
tags not only on each part of the reproductive process, but ulti-
mately on the entire process itself, thereby succumbing to baby-
selling. Such a practice violates the dignity of children and flies in
the face of our deepest social values. Moreover, allowing access to
these new reproductive services primarily to those who are finan-
cially well off unfairly privileges the well to do at the expense of
those who are not. Protestants have therefore been cautious about
using money to attract gamete donors and, more generally, about
accepting payments to donors as moral.
During in vitro fertilization, more embryos are often produced
than can be used at one time. The question of the moral status of
these early embryos and the protection they should be given has
been a thorny one for Protestants. Some believe that the same
protection should be accorded to the newly fertilized egg as to a
postnatal human being.55 This belief is based on recognition that
the unique genetic complement of an individual is largely estab-
lished at conception. There seems no obvious point in embryonic
development that these thinkers can detect when "unformed" fetal
life becomes "formed" and physically developed enough to receive
a human soul, a traditional distinction made within Christian
thought for many centuries. 6 Others observe that for at least four-
teen days after conception, embryos may divide or even fuse and
maintain that, therefore, they are not distinct individuals for the
first fourteen days. They hold that early embryos are not owed
the same protection as later embryos or as discrete individual
human beings. Despite these differences, Protestants unite in
maintaining the embryos are owed respect and that they should be
54. Cynthia B. Cohen, Selling Bits and Pieces of Humans to Make Babies: "The
Gift of the Magi" Revisited, 24 J. MED. & PHIL. 288, 295-98 (1999).
55. OLIVER O'DoNOVAN, THE CHRISTIAN AND THE UNBORN CHILD 15 (1986);
David Atkinson, Some Theological Perspectives on the Human Embryo (Part 2), in 2
ETHICS AND MEDICINE: A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 23, 32 (1986).
56. JOHN CONNERY, ABORTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
PERSPECTIVE 40, 50-52, 56 (1977).
57. G.R. Dunstan, The Embryo, from Aristotle to Alton, 38 HIST. TODAY, Apr.
1988, at 6-8; see also JAMES C. PETERSON, GENETIC TURNING POINTS: THE ETHICS OF
HUMAN GENETICS INTERVENTION 123,126, 134 (2001); Anthony Dyson, At Heaven's
command?: the Churches, theology, and experiments on embryos, in EXPERIMENTS ON
EMBRYOS, supra note 3, at 98-99.
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treated in ways that are potentially beneficial to them whenever
possible. 8 This implies that only as many embryos should be pro-
duced as are strictly needed over the course of attempts at in vitro
fertilization, and that every effort should be made to avoid leaving
behind "surplus" frozen embryos.
CONCLUSION
It will require much more observation and discussion for those
within the Protestant tradition to reach a clear mind about which
purposes to which the new reproductive technologies can be put
are morally acceptable. The underlying Protestant view is that it is
allowable to use certain of these technologies to circumvent infer-
tility and bring children into the world. Yet there are major differ-
ences among Protestant thinkers about which reproductive
technologies should be used, whose gametes, and for what pur-
poses. There is a general acceptance of the use of IVF, but less
agreement about whether to add the use of donated gametes when
employing this procedure. Moreover, Protestants tend to maintain
that it is wrong to use the new reproductive technologies to design
children in their parents' own image and according to parental
tastes, rather than to bring forth children who are to be loved and
nurtured in the own right as unique individuals.
We stand in unprecedented circumstances today as new repro-
ductive technologies make available to us ways of having children
that were never dreamed of in earlier times. Protestant thinkers
recognize that their tradition of moral thought, which has not been
honed on the specific questions raised by these novel technologies,
will need to be extended to capture the nuances in moral thinking
that they bring to the fore and to address them. This does not
mean that previous Protestant moral thinking must be radically
changed or dismissed. It means that the implications of that think-
ing must be more thoroughly and specifically developed in the face
of the problems and anguish experienced by many who desperately
hope that their loving union will be blessed with children.
58. SMITH, supra note 7, at 86-88.
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